and structured by the imposition of functional relationships, the same arithmetic procedures are invariably used. These are essentially least-squares methods of functional estimation borrowed from the physical sciences. They have remained virtually unchanged since the days of Gauss.
If modest claims had been made for the additional descriptive power provided by conventional least-squares methods, few could object to their use in the form of regression and correlation analyses. Unfortunately, they brought with them the massive, and at first impressive, intellectual and conceptual paraphernalia of inferential statistics. As a result, the notion of significance testing, involving the formal assignment of probability levels to statements, almost seemed to become the end of geographic enquiry. Perhaps it is still so considered by many to be the ideal towards which all efforts should be directed. But inferential tests raise problems of their own. I shall try to review these by considering the assumptions underlying the tests one by one. Three prior points should be made, however.
First, it has been extremely difficult to find a clear, consistent, and complete statement of the assumptions underlying the inferential tests of regression and correlation analysis. Helpful references include Hald [ [14] , and Plackett [25] .
Secondly, and not withstanding the general argument of this paper, there may be occasions when conventional inferential statistics can serve as useful research aids. These cases will probably be simple, non-spatial situations in which some educated guesses are capable of being investigated in inferential terms. Such occasions are likely to be rare.
Thirdly, the utility of inferential statistics can be supported by the contribution the methods can make to a teaching program. There is considerable pedagogic worth in a course that raises in a formal fashion the many questions and problems involved in marshalling objective evidence. Even if conventional methods turn out to be largely inappropriate to most spatial research, such a course can do much to correct vague thinking; a student who has taken a sequence of quantitative courses containing inferential methods, taught by a geographer, using clear and stimulating geographical exercises and examples, has a distinct advantage. A beginning student's approach to problem solving and generation is enhanced not the least because many methods open up a host of intriguing geographic problems. There is quite a genuine serendipity effect, which surely forms one of the most potent arguments for teaching courses of this sort within a geography department. More important, the methods by their generality form bridges to other disciplines, and allow students to read the literature more critically and with greater understanding. Today this is crucial.
Some statisticians imply that the body of inferential statistics is virtually the embodiment of the scientific method usually espoused by philosophers of science who have never worked as scientists. If one shares their assumptions, and is willing to turn a blind eye to three hundred years of scientific enquiry totally bereft of inferential statistics, their case is a strong one. But men like Margeneau and Polanyi, who have the courage to practice what they preach instead of sitting on the sidelines, take a gentler, broader, and wiser view of the scientific method, recognizing rather than paying lip service to the wellspring of intuition that lies behind creative enquiry. Above all, we need wisdom when we consider the purpose and utility of correspondence rules between observation and model. Homomorphic mappings, by definition, filter information away so that correspondence can never be exact. Judgments of goodness of fit must be influenced by the severity of the underlying mapping, which means that standardized inferential rulebooks are going to be very hard to write.
THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS
When a test of significance is applied it rests upon a number of clearly specified assumptions. The assumptions we shall consider apply to the usual parametric tests, though some also underlie the so-called non-parametric or distribution-free methods. Unfortunately, the behavior of the statistician has not always been impeccable here; too frequently he spells out only some of the assumptions upon which a particular test of significance rests, specifying only partially the conditions under which a scientist may infer larger consequences of his experiments at certain well-specified levels of assurance or probability. These assumptions are usually made to simplify the mathematics involved. It is difficult to think of a better reason from the point of view of the statistician, but they are harder to justify in a discipline, particularly if their severity closes off areas of enquiry. In the early years of statistical research, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, many of the assumptions formed quite plausible descriptions of contemporary physical data and experiments. Unfortunately, they are frequently quite meaningless as descriptions of social and behavioral data. We shall consider only the assumptions underlying conventional tests of significance used in standard correlation and regression analyses. Regression models assume that the independent variable, X, is fixed, and multiple independent samples are taken of Y. In usi in our particular analyses. When these least-sql are plotted by computer today, ignoring plicit as them is difficult to excuse. It simply re-That is, suits in a distressing waste of informa-such a tion when we need every scrap of in-chance c sight we can get. We are not so knowl-easiest a edgeable that we can squander informa-ably pla tion, especially when good data are so is a lar~ rare and expensive. We should raise the tion tha question of non-linearity much more fre-entirety, quently, and approach a body of hard-on a rar won data with the notion that non-linUndei earities may exist. sonable The caveats espoused about relation-the larg ships being "linear over the range of the we have data" also tend to be excuses rather than tion un reasons. In cases where the data have a significa: limited range, would it not be better: to correlati try to get information over a wider range from flu if possible, or to think through and mar-was real shal plausible arguments for a functional between relationship that forms a more valid de-ulation. scription of the way changes in one or variable more variables produce changes in an-them ag other? We live in a non-linear world, while, j yet, with a few marked exceptions, ex-slope vc Situations often occur in geographic research where samples need not be taken. Very often whole populations can be investigated, yet the results of inferential tests of significance are still conscientiously reported. But having investigated a whole population, to what are we now inferring our results? It is here that we wriggle and turn, trying to justify the use of such tests on whole populations by noting that we have taken "a sample at one slice in time," or "the sample represents a larger population existing at other places besides the region with which we have dealt." But these arguments sound very weak in the context of the rigorous assumptions of random sampling. Measures we obtain, whether correlation or regression coefficients, describe the degree of association existing between the variables. The idea of running conventional significance tests to infer something about a larger population when there is no larger population seems peculiar to say the least.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE VARIABLES AND THE ERROR TERMS
Kendall [15, p. 186] has noted that "all we know is based upon normal theory and is probably not very robust." Thus it is almost true to say that the entire body of parametric statistics built during the last seventy years is founded upon the fundamental assumption that variables entering analyses are distributed in a normal fashion. For most geographic variables the assumption does not hold by the most charitable stretch of the imagination, and since the fifties a succession of monographs and papers have appeared in which variables have been transformed to achieve normality of distribution.
The reasons for most of these transformations should be emphasized as clearly as possible. Statisticians have devised a body of inferential tests which are based upon the often unrealistic assumption of normality to simplify a very difficult mathematics. Before machines were available to bludgeon apart difficult problems in distributional theory by the sheer power of computation, this was the only course possible. But the compulsion to squeeze the world of man into this uncommon distribution for the purposes of so-called "testing of hypotheses" leads to some unfortunate effects. When we transfer variables in either a regression or correlation analysis to make the distributions conform to the statistician's specified assumptions, we may also change the very form of the relationship and model. A transformation of both variables to logarithms, for example, implies that there is an exponential relationship between the variables. Sometimes the models produced by such transformations do make better sense than the original, linear and additive relations postulated by the initial simple regression analysis. But this is usually pure luck since we seldom seem to think about the form of the functional relationships anyway. If this is the case, it really does not matter what transformations we undertake, but we should not pretend that we are doing research. Too often we end up relating the value of one variable to the log of another, with the square root of the third, the arc sin of a fourth, and the log of a log of a fifth. Everything is normal, statistically significant at the one percent level -except that we have not the faintest idea what it means. In the same breath we complain that theory is slow STATISTIX INFEBENS in developing, but is it any wonder after When such nonsense? To produce model regressio changes simply to fulfill the computa-id, and tionally simplifying assumptions of in-tion holc ferential statistics seems to be going for-is justifiE ward in such a posterior fashion that we sumptior shall soon disappear up our own Klein glance, bottles. indepenc A second assumption in the area of unspecifi distributions is that the errors in our should observations are also normally distrib-which t uted about a mean of zero. This notion thermorc appears to have been passed down from preting the days of Gauss, and in the context of not simp a number of problems of astronomical in Y, bi observation being investigated at that well. Bu time it probably formed a reasonable of residi description of the facts. As Hogben [12] tion und has pointed out in his rather pungent inferenti way, if we point telescopes at stars by sense. using lots of gearwheels, all the little errors of observation will probably form THE IND a symmetrical distribution with big AND ES errors less common than small ones. But there is absolutely no reason why we In eni should expect such an assumption to ism, and hold for many observations we make nificance and use in geographic research. Many observat of our observations are simple enumera-others [ tions of finite phenomena rather than sumptioi estimates from continua. Moreover, the and dis assumption in regression analysis that ence, in the error is only in the dependent varia-means a ble is totally at variance with our every-correlati day experience. We know perfectly well which is that variables are never error free, and to ordei it is often impossible to approach the time an experimental control of the physical chance( scientist in which an X is set "exactly" when tt Now it has been demonstrated by Nordbeck [24] that even a variable such as population density is continuous. Randomly generated values over space are "continuized" by his reference interval technique, so that an observation from such a surface can no longer be considered as independent of the values around it. Knowing one value on the surface provides the observer with a better than random chance of predicting nearby values. We should, perhaps, recall geography's first "law" that "... everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things" [31] . If Nordbeck's demonstration holds, the implications are interesting. For example, in any population distribution the density at one point is dependent upon values around it. So, presumably, in the underlying distribution of people, no man's location or no town's position is independent of another's. This seems intuitively obvious and valid, and if true it implies that random spatial distributions of human phenomena cannot exist. Our measures, whether nearest neighbor or simple contiguity counts, may imply randomness in the plane in a strictly limited, mathematically descriptive sense. But given our knowledge that there is some underlying black box or distributional mechanism, such measures may be geographically meaningless and even thought-limiting. Further, if we can even crudely speculate about the process producing a distribution, we should be able to work towards the specification of a weighting system for a communication, as opposed to an irrelevant Euclidean space that will demonstrate the autocorrelation, and therefore lack of randomness in the transformed and now analytically relevant space (see Cliff and Ord, this volume). Perhaps, in the future, we will even have instances in geographic research where such procedures are reversed. That is, by trying to estimate a weighting matrix to maximize the spatial autocorrelation of a variable, even one that conventional measures show to be random in Euclidean space, we may disclose processual avenues and linkages previously unsuspected. Now our response to spatial autocorrelation is going to take some careful thinking through. Even if all the other things hold, it is difficult to see how the geographer will want to "correct" for autocorrelation in order to fulfill the assumptions required by an inferential test. Surely such corrections will represent a throwing out of the baby and keeping the bathwater? A regression analysis, the simple relating of one thing to another, may well uncover the really interesting geographic point. It can be used in a quite exploratory fashion to isolate a thoroughly spatial effect by holding constant, or slipping out the effects of other variables that may be essentially non-spatial in and of themselves. One study by Reynolds and Archer [28] uses multiple regression in this way to isolate possible contagious effects in voting patterns, and in a very thoughtful study Aldskogius [3] has clarified the effects of private communi-cation fields upon vacation house settlements in Central Sweden. Similarly, in migration studies, multiple regression models have some utility in exploring the structure of such a complex and dynamic phenomenon. Indeed, the residuals from such analyses, highlighting the clear "autocorrelative clusters" may well be considered as the best measures we have of the total cumulative feedback effects which we know exert powerful influences in such processes. Note , But what do they mean in more explicit terms? Basically, the level of significance chosen should rest upon the cost of making a mistake, although this judgment will be influenced by the degree to which the investigator is willing to personify Nature as a vindictive bitch or a benign Earth Mother. At this point, however, we may legitimately question whether we are in the statistico-scientific ballpark-or whether the game is even worth playing.
For example, if we are testing batches of polio vaccine, making a mistake one time out of a hundred will mean thousands of children stricken. But one can imagine circumstances of extreme emergency during an epidemic when such chances would be well worth taking since ninety-nine children might be saved for every one given the disease by the vaccine. Such a grisly example has been chosen deliberately to emphasize that the value system of the investigator and his society really underlies the apparent formal values of probability so conscientiously reported. These are seldom explicitly considered or reported by an investigator. In most geographic research, the costs of making a mistake are not nearly so drastic, although in most cases it is difficult to think through the actual costs involved. But surely most conventional levels are much too stringent, because at the root of most value systems we might consider lies the very human and very basic psychological willingness of a geographer to make a fool of himself in front of his colleagues. This is usually the "cost" of making an erroneous decision, but providing it is made for the sake of following a reasonably plausible idea, the error should not be disparaged. We have so few mistakes in our field, and such paucity is an unfortunate reflection on the lack of boldness to guess at answers. As Popper has noted repeatedly [26] , only by guessing and being wrong can we ultimately be "right" in any worthwhile and non-trivial sense. The paths of exciting and relevant sciences are littered with good mistakes. Many investigations at this stage of geographic enquiry are exploratory in nature and good mistakes should be made frequently.
WHAT CAN WE Do?
Given the fact that the assumptions seldom hold individually, and that the chances of them holding severally is virtually zero, it is difficult not to think of traditional, non-spatial inferential statistics as totally irrelevant as correspondence rules in geographic enquiry. At the very least, the discussion above should give pause to those who advocate greater use of more formal hypothesis testing using bodies of methodology developed in other fields for quite different purposes and under radically different conditions. Let us quickly review the assumptions once again: (1) a theory of error and a method of least squares devised by Gauss for quite different purposes than estimating structural equations, (2) a bi-or multivariate distribution that actually contradicts the first assumption of regression models, (3) random sampling from an infinite population which seldom exists, (4) independence of observations, which is virtually inconceivable in any spatial or temporal problem of any interest or profundity to a geographer. And then there are related questions of scale, homoscedasticity, and independence of residual terms. Are these the foundations of our correspondence rules for questions of goodness of fit?
But now let us examine some possible avenues of methodological development that have opened up with the availability of large and fast computing machines. As an example, suppose we do face some problems of judgment in multivariate investigations in which we are developing some descriptive or estimating equations, and testing some hunches about a series of variables. There is a quite genuine question of whether an increase in accounted variation in a dependent variable is significant when we add a new variable to our analysis. When we say significant in this context, we really mean that the increase is worthy of our attention, and that the new variable is helpful in that it plausibly accounts for an additional amount that probably would not have arisen just by adding numbers at random.
Because of computational difficulties, conventional approaches had to make some assumptions about the distribution of the new variable, its independence of others in the analysis, and so on. Under these assumptions, the question -is it significant? -meant: could this increase in r or b have arisen if we had added a variable that was quite unrelated to the dependent variable simply because the new one is represented in our analysis by a random sample from an infinite population that is normally distributed, · . . and so on. The answer was always: yes, it could but the likelihood, or probability, of this happening is such and such a level. The actual computation of the probability level rested upon the assumptions-the one about random sampling being crucial, because we are asking how likely an increase in accounted variation is from a sampling fluke with the specific distributional characteristics. Another way of investigating the same thing is by looking at the increase in variation accounted for by adding the new variable to what was previously left over. In the first case a t test is invoked, in the second an F test; both are parametric and based upon the same assumptions. Both are usually quite invalid because of the assumptions invoked.
In our concern to decide and judge upon the worth of a particular variable in a multivariate analysis, we can consider another course of action. Two examples may illustrate the possibilities.
First, suppose we can only measure a variable in a binary or dummy form, which means that the assumption of normality can never be fulfilled. In posing the question of significance, we can cast the question into the form: how likely is it that if I had taken this number of zeros and this number of ones and assigned them at random to the observations at this stage in the analysis that I would have got an r, b, or accounted variation of this magnitude? This, it
